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Japan's relationship with the world and especially with the Asia-Pacific 
region is changing rapidly. These shifts hold both promise for closer and 
more productive interactions as well as concerns over the possible exclusive 
nature of the evolving relationships. The cause of the changes come from 
the macroeconomic developments considered in Dick Nanto's paper-
-developments that have produced large net capital outflows and a strong 
appreciation of the yen. The purpose of this paper is to explore Japan's 
position in the development of trade and investment ties in the Asia-Pacific 
region, review the changes now taking place in Japan's relationship toward 
these countries, and provide some speculation on future developments. 
Economic ties among Asia-Pacific nations have increased over time, 
although most of the increase is due to larger flows between these countries 
and the United States and Japan. Even without these two, however, a gradual 
strengthening of trade ties has taken place. Japan and the United States 
have had trade and investment roles of roughly equal importance toward the 
rest of the region, but the changes now taking place will bring Japan closer 
while diminishing the position of the United States. As this shift unfolds, 
there is some concern that Japan's stronger relationship with the region 
will take an exclusive form, pulling other Asian nations closer to it while 
progressively excluding the United States and other non-Asian nations. Such 
moves would not be in the interest of the United States, and could be 
economically and politically harmful throughout the region. This paper  
concludes that cooperation in the region should not, therefore, take the 
form of any formal regional trade preference arrangement. Furthermore, 
while a new formal regional organization which would bring together 
government officials to discuss matters of mutual interest make sense given 
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the rising regional economic ties, most economic issues are properly 
discussed in a global setting rather than a regional one. 
Background 
The countries of the Asia Pacific region have little in common other 
than geography. The United States is generally assumed to belong to the 
region, but it is not tied to Asia by any strong cultural features. Even 
within Asia, the cultural and religious differences among nations are quite 
large, although some common cultural traits characterize all or most of 
these countries. Furthermore, the economic differences are enormous, 
ranging from Japan and the United States as advanced industrial nations with 
very high per capita incomes, to China and the Indochina countries close to 
the bottom of world incomes and development. This region, therefore, is 
very different from Europe where common land borders and strong cultural and 
historical connections have driven a process of integration. In the Asia-
Pacific area geography remains the main reason for closer economic ties. 
Economic relations among these countries can be considered in a number 
of ways. The discussion here concentrates on three of these: merchandise 
trade, direct investment flows, and foreign aid. Connections among these 
individual ties certainly exists, especially in the case of Japan, but it is 
convenient to begin by considering them separately. 
Merchandise Trade--Data on intra-regional trade is presented in Table 1, 
based on the detailed trade matrix presented in Table 2. For all the  
nations on the list, the share of exports destined to other nations in the 
region was almost one half (48 percent) in 1986. This represents a very 
large gain of 27 percentage points since 1966. The only nations included in 





Canada and the Soviet Union, and they are excluded from the discussion in 
the remainder of this paper. 
Much of the regional trade is accounted for by the United States and 
Japan, and the very rapid growth of the Japanese economy could account for a 
large portion of the above results. Therefore, Table 1 also shows trade for 
a subset of the region--the list of countries in Table 1 minus Japan, the 
United States, Canada and the Soviet Union. As might be expected, the share 
of exports going to others within the subset is much lower (24 percent in 
1986), and the growth over time is generally lower as well (up 9 percentage 
points from 15 percent in 1966). Nevertheless, it is significant that this 
share is increasing. The rise is especially noticeable for the three former 
British colonies--Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia. Over the 20 year 
period in the table, these three lost much of their attachment to the 
British commonwealth countries and became much more integrated with Asia, 
including both the entire group of countries in the table and the sub-
region. 
As evident from Table 2, the nature of relationships between individual 
countries on this list and the major markets of Japan and the United States 
is diverse. In 1986, the countries in the subset sent 24 percent of their 
exports to the United States (a substantial gain from 14 percent in 1966), 
while only 14 percent went to Japan (down three percentage points over the 
same period). The downward shift for Japan is due primarily to the 
diversification of trade by Taiwan and South Korea, both of which were  
colonies before the war and remained highly dependent on Japan as an export 
market for a time after the war. 
In addition to the fact that a larger share of exports has gone to the 
United States, there is a qualitative difference in trade with the United 
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States and with Japan. Those few countries with a substantial share of 
their exports destined to Japan are mostly raw material exporting countries: 
Australia (coal and iron ore), Malaysia (tin), and Indonesia (oil and gas). 
Japan has had a reputation in the past for not welcoming manufactured 
imports from the world or from Asia. Indicative of Japan's reluctance to 
import manufactures, the ratio of manufactured imports to GDP remains 
considerably below that of other industrial nations. Furthermore, the bulk 
of the increase in Asian exports in the first half of the 1980 was to the 
United States. Japan's imports from the rest of Asia stagnated (and in some 
cases dropped because of falling raw material prices). 
On the import side (Table 3), similar relationships are visible, 
although the relative roles of Japan and the United States are reversed. 
For individual countries, the importance of the region or the subregion as a 
source of imports is largely the same as the export picture. However, the 
share of imports in these countries sourced from Japan was 24 percent in 
1986 (up substantially over 1966, while the share from the United States was 
a smaller 19 percent (virtually unchanged since 1966). The only Asian 
countries importing more from the United States than from Japan are the 
Philippines (with strong historical ties to the United States) and 
Australia. For a number of others, Japan has a far greater share of imports 
than does the United States, including China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and 
Thailand. 
These data on exports and imports indicate that Japan and the United  
States are the major trading partners for these countries. But in no sense 
1. Japan's relative lack of manufactured imports is discussed in detail in 
Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (Washington: The Brookings 
Institution, forthcoming). 
TABLE 3 
IMPORTS FROM THE REI3ION 
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has Japan "replaced" the United States within the region. The United States 
has not lost share as either a destination for the exports of these 
countries nor as a source of their imports. On the import side, Japan's 
gain as a source of the region's imports has come at the expense of 
countries other than the United States. A better characterization would be 
to say that both Japan and the United States have come to dominate the trade 
of these nations to a greater degree than in the past. Nevertheless, the 
high share of Japan in the imports of these countries, and the growth of 
that share is a significant long-term development. 
Direct Investment--Investment patterns appear roughly similar to trade. 
Table 4 presents basic data on direct investment. In the Asian NICs, the 
United States has generally had higher levels of cumulative investment 
(except in South Korea), while in the ASEAN countries, Japan has had the 
larger share (except for the Philippines). Only in Malaysia are neither 
Japan nor the United States the largest single foreign investor (with that 
position held by Singapore). 
Much of Japanese foreign direct investment has been destined toward 
Asia, but over time a smaller share of investment has gone to Asia as the 
horizons of Japanese investors have expanded. A large share of Japan's 
direct investment in Asia in the past has also gone to resource development 
projects, dominated by Indonesia. Manufacturing investment in developing 
countries in Asia has not been a large part of Japanese investment activity 
in the past, and the manufacturing investment that did take place was  
motivated more by the desire to supply products to local markets or to third 
markets (especially the United States). An attempt to circumvent import 
protectionism in these countries or in the United States provided a stronger 
rationale for manufacturing investment than did the existence of low wages. 
TABLE 4 
Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Asian Countries 
V 
-6-
Japanese industry has had a generally strong belief that it could 
manufacture products of higher quality and with competitive prices from a 
Japanese production base even as the relative cost of labor rose steadily 
through the 1960s and 1970s. Japanese innovations in manufacturing 
processes, including methods of reducing inventory costs (such as just-in-
time production) and reducing product defect rates were assumed to be 
dependent on a concentration of the manufacturing process geographically, 
and on the special nature of human relationships in the Japanese culture. 
Japanese firms generally sought to reduce labor costs through automation 
rather than by moving abroad. 
With these perceptions of the advantages of Japanese manufacturing 
technology, investments abroad have tended to have an unusually high number 
of Japanese nationals in the management structure.^ In addition, some 
countries, especially China, have been complaining for some time over the 
relative lack of technology transfer to these subsidiaries. 
Foreign Aid—Unlike trade and direct investment, Japan is the dominant 
source of ODA for Asian developing countries. The total amount of ODA from 
Japan now rivals that of the United States (with the Japanese expecting that 
in 1989 they may actually surpass the United States), and the dollar amount 
continues to grow at a fairly rapid pace. According to OECD data, total 
Japanese ODA has been growing at a 5.7 percent annual average rate from 1982 
to 1987, while that of the United States has grown at only a 2.2 percent 
rate.J Of Japanese ODA disbursed bilaterally, the majority continues to go 
2. Nihei, Ohtsu, and Levin, "A Comparative Study of Management Practices and 
Workers in an American and Japanese Firm in Hong Kong," in Hong and 
Levin, eds., Contemporary Issues in Hong Kong Labour Relations (Hong 
Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1983). 
3. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development 
Cooperation, 1988 Report (Paris, OECD 1988), p. 172. 
-7-
to Asia, even though that portion has declined somewhat over time as Japan 
has added other, non-Asian countries to the list of recipients. As of 1986, 
the share of Japan's bilateral aid destined to Asia (broadly defined to 
include South Asia) was 73 percent. 
Figure 1 shows for the ASEAN countries the share of Japan, the United 
States, and the multilateral aid agencies in net total ODA receipts. Net 
receipts represent actual new disbursements minus repayment of concessional 
loans, and thereby represents a more accurate figure on actual foreign aid 
activity than does commitments. Two striking facts are evident from these 
data: Japan provides half or more of the ODA received by each of the ASEAN 
countries (far outdistancing funds from the multilateral agencies), and the 
United States provides virtually nothing except to the Philippines. For 
ASEAN as a whole, Japan provided 55 percent of net ODA in 1987, with the 
United States accounting for only 11 percent, and the multilateral 
organizations only 10 percent. 
The dollar amounts of the ODA flows to Asian countries is displayed in 
Table 5. Other than the Philippines, American ODA to ASEAN is pitifully 
small: none to Malaysia, $36 million to Indonesia, $23 million to Thailand 
and $1 million to Singapore. Except for Singapore, Japan's ODA is measured 
in hundreds of millions of dollars, and it outspends the United States even 
in the Philippines. Furthermore, the top recipient of Japanese aid for the 
past several years has been China (with net receipts from Japan in 1987 of 
$553 million), a country to which the United States provides nothing.  
The incident in Tienanmen Square in the spring of 1989 put a temporary 
hold on Japanese aid to China, but there was every indication that the hold 
4. Ibid., p. 178. 
FIGURE ' 
Shares of Net ODA Flow, 1987 
TABLE 5 
Net ODA Received by Southeast Asian Countries, 1987 
(amounts in millions of dollars) 
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would be very short-lived. The Japanese government has played a very low-
key role in joining other industrial countries in criticizing the Chinese 
government, and the hold was officially implemented because of concern that 
the turmoil in China would disrupt the ability to handle incoming foreign 
aid monies. This approach left the Japanese government free to resume 
foreign aid quickly, and even by the end of the summer of 1989, the 
government appeared to be ready to do so. Although the government position 
on the China problem was couched in terms of the delicate and special 
relationship between Japan and China stemming from the atrocities of the 
war, it also opened the way for Japan to play an even larger role in China's 
external financial ties by returning relations to normal in advance of other 
industrial nations. 
The picture in Indochina is different. Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, and 
Laos all receive some ODA from the world, but neither Japan nor the United 
States is heavily involved (except for Japan's provision of $172 million to 
Burma in 1987). The multilateral aid agencies and certain European nations 
play a much larger role here. Should the conflict in Indochina come to an 
end, though, the way would be opened for much larger aid flows. Devastated 
by decades of war and inefficient economic management, these nations are 
prime candidates for increased foreign aid efforts, and Japan, at least, 
would be in a position to provide much larger sums of money. Japan has 
remained cautious to date, apparently not desiring to move much beyond 
American policy, especially in the case of Vietnam. 
Japanese aid used to be criticized for having a high tied ratio and for 
being excessively motivated by Japanese commercial interests. Although the 
share of untied aid in Japan's aid mix has increased, it continues to have 
an unusually low grant ratio and the complaints of commercial motivation 
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continue unabated. The OECD puts Japan's grant element (the share of ODA 
disbursed as grants rather than as loans) at only 62 percent in 1986-1987, 
compared to an 87 percent DAC average and 97 percent for the United States. 
The grant element for Japan actually declined from 75 percent at the 
beginning of the 1980s.5 Even untied aid from Japan is often structured in 
such a way (as through tied engineering studies) that Japanese manufacturers 
end up with the contracts. This bias is even true of multilateral loans 
from the Asian Development Bank, and American officials involved with the 
Bank have been complaining for at least the past decade that their Japanese 
counterparts do all they can to steer contracts for ADB-financed projects to 
Japanese corporations. 
Japan also continues to be plagued with a woefully inadequate 
bureaucratic infrastructure. The two principal Japanese aid agencies--the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Overseas Economic 
Cooperation Fund (OECF) are seriously understaffed and have very limited 
capabilities to monitor field work. Partly because of the understaffing, 
the Japanese government continues its policy of providing aid only on a 
request basis; it responds only to project proposals submitted by recipient 
countries rather than using its own people to design an agenda of projects. 
This policy reinforces the tendency for a commercial bias in aid because 
Japanese trading companies operating in these countries often become the 
leaders in designing projects and helping the governments of these countries 
5. Ibid., p. 174. 
6. Officially, Japan and the United States have equal capital participation 
and equal numbers of personnel at the Asian Development Bank. By 
agreement, Japan has the director of the bank, which would seem to be a 
minor advantage. However, the sense among Americans is that the Japanese 
have an undue influence over bank affairs. 
v 
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deal with the Japanese aid agencies. This tendency is not at all surprising 
since these companies have the planning expertise that is often lacking in 
developing countries and have the expertise in dealing with the Japanese 
bureaucracy, but their interests are obviously and inextricably tied to 
those of the Japanese manufacturing and commercial sectors. 
Consider further that the principal institute in Japan designed to 
conduct research on developing economies is actually a subsidiary of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The Institute of 
Developing Economies is known in Japanese as Aj iken (Asian Research), which 
is an indication of the organization's principal research focus. The 
institute is a credible organization that engages in sophisticated economic 
research, but the fact that its research agenda is provided entirely by MITI 
is disquieting. MITI, one of several government ministries involved in 
overseeing Japanese foreign aid, promotes the interests of the Japanese 
manufacturing sector. 
Changes and Implications 
For many years Japan has been the "bad guy" in the Asia Pacific region-
-accused of not importing enough, not transferring technology with 
investment, and driving hard bargains (tied financial assistance, sales of 
defective equipment, etc), with rememberance of the militarism of the 1930s 
and 1940s always strong among other Asian countries. Whether these 
accusations were truly justified or not, current macroeconomic changes will 
bring major changes in Japan's reception throughout the region. The 
willingness of all these countries to attend the funeral of the Showa 
emperor in February 1989, who symbolized the wartime agony they suffered at 
the hands of the Japanese military, is one sign of the changes taking place. 
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Rapid shifts are now occurring in all three dimensions of the economic 
relationships explored above. First, Japan's imports of manufactured goods 
have been rising rapidly since 1986 and could continue to do so for some 
time. Second, Japan's foreign direct investment in the region is growing 
somewhat more rapidly, even though that growth is considerably lower than 
the high and rising growth in investment destined to other regions of the 
world. Third, ODA continues to expand at a substantial pace, and a large 
portion of the bilateral segment of this aid continues to be allocated to 
Asian countries. 
As long as the yen remains very strong and the Japanese economy 
continues to expand through domestic demand, these trends should continue. 
The rise in the yen, up 100 percent against the dollar since 1985, has 
provided the motivation for the increase in imports. Even a country such as 
Japan which can be described as protectionist (even though tariffs and 
quotas are no longer significant) must respond to movements in exchange 
rates. The landed cost of foreign products is now so much below that of 
domestic products in many cases that manufacturers and distributors cannot 
ignore them. Furthermore, broader attitudes among businesses and consumers 
toward the role of manufactured imports in the economy appear to be 
changing. Whereas government publications used to enumerate the reasons why 
Japan imported few manufactured goods, they are now extolling the virtues of 
imports (as a means of controlling inflation, increasing consumer choice, 
and providing competitive pressure on domestic industry). The  
distribution sector, long considered part of the problem in getting 
7. See especially the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Tsusho 
Hakusho [Trade White Paper], 1988 edition (Tokyo: Ministry of Finance 
Printing Office, 1988). 
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manufactured goods into the country, is now undergoing some scrutiny from 
the government and at least modest regulatory liberalization appears likely. 
The strong appreciation of the yen has also provided a greater incentive 
to invest abroad. Despite the conviction that firms had concerning the 
virtues of keeping production centrally located at home, the disparity in 
costs between Japan and other countries is now causing them to change their 
attitudes. But even now the impact of these changes on Asia have been 
moderate. As shown in Table 6, Japan's cumulative direct investment in the 
manufacturing sector in Asia was growing at a 10.8 percent annual pace in 
the first half of the 1980s, rising to a 15.7 percent annual rate from 1985 
through 1988. This acceleration was far more modest than the overall rate 
of direct investment growth after 1985 (25.5 percent) or the rather high 
growth of FDI in North America (43.3 percent). 
Even this moderate acceleration in Japanese foreign direct investment in 
the rest of Asia should bring a rise in Japan's relative position. Relative 
to other foreign investors and relative to the local economies, Japan will 
become more visible. Furthermore, new investment will likely be 
concentrated in a very small number of Asian countries (Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Malaysia principal among them) where the Japanese presence will 
be even more noticeable. Japanese investors also are more adept at tying 
local firms closely to themselves even though their equity ownership 
position may be small through retention of critical skills in Japanese staff 
dispatched to the local operation or through tight control over non-equity 
financing (bank loans and trade credit), which may make the perception of 
Japanese dominance far stronger than simple data on the dollar amount of 
investment would indicate. 
Table 6 
Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
(millions of dollars) 
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Other indicators show a strong increase in Japanese attention directed 
toward Asia. The Japanese business media have been emphasizing Asia much 
more over the past two years, and one could term 1987 the year of the 
discovery of the Asian NICs and 1988 the discovery of ASEAN by the Japanese 
press. With an upbeat assessment of the region, the media are promoting the 
idea that these countries are capable of producing goods of sufficient 
quality for the Japanese market, thereby endorsing the idea of increased 
direct investment. Therefore, Japanese firms are seeing Asia as a base 
for production of goods destined for consumption in Japan (rather than for 
local or third markets as in the past). Data from a recent MITI survey 
indicates that the portion of output from Japanese-owned factories in Asia 
shipped to Japan has risen from 9.8 percent in 1980 to 16.7 percent in 1987. 
This portion is considerably higher than the 9.1 percent average for all 
Japanese overseas investment. 
Finally, the pressures that have caused Japan's foreign aid spending to 
increase continue to be present. As a major economic power, the Japanese 
government feels the pressure to provide a greater contribution to 
international peace and stability. The public and government continue to 
believe that Japan's primary contribution to the world should be economic 
rather than military, although defense spending has also risen at an above 
average pace in the 1980s. Even though defense spending and foreign 
8. As an example of this trend, see "Aj ia no Seiki: Nihon no Yakuwari" [The 
Asian Century: Japan's Role], Toyo Keizai, November 15, 1986; or Yukiko 
Fukagawa, "Ajia no Dainamizumu o Torikomu Nihon: Nihon-ASEAN-NICs no 
Shin Sangyo Chizu" [Japan Grasping Asian Dynamism: The New Industrial 
Map of Japan/ASEAN/NICs], Ekonomisuto, July 4, 1988. 
9. Kenji Takeuchi, "Effects of Japanese Direct Foreign Investment on Japan's 
Imports of Manufactures from Developing Economies," unpublished paper, 
World Bank, 1989. 
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economic aid are by not means entirely substitutable commodities, there is 
some tendency to view them as such in Japan. Note, however, that in much of 
the discussion of these issues in Japan, the main motivation is one of 
obligation to the other industrial nations. By spending more on foreign 
aid, the Japanese government appears more intent upon impressing the United 
States and the European countries that it is doing more to carry the 
"burden" of international security than upon actually contributing to world 
development. Whatever the motive, though, Japanese aid will continue to 
grow at an above average rate. 
As it grows, Japanese foreign aid continues a close association with 
industry. Keidanren, for example, established a new organization, the Japan 
International Development Organization, Ltd. (JAIDO) in the spring of 1989 
to promote direct investment in developing countries. This organization is 
one-third funded by the OECF--the government's soft loan agency mentioned 
above. Keidanren has also established an internal group, the Committee on 
International Cooperation Projects (CICP) to oversee and approve JAIDO 
investments.10 In essence, JAIDO and CICP provide a vehicle to gain 
concessionary financing for Japanese commercial direct investment in Asian 
countries. American officials are also concerned that this will become a 
means for Japan to gain more influence over the Asian Development Bank, as 
JAIDO begins to request co-financing for its investments. JAIDO may be a 
useful tool in promoting beneficial investment and economic development in 
Asia, but it provides an explicit combination of government and business to 
promote Japanese economic benefit which runs counter to much of U.S. foreign 
10. Japan Times Weekly Overseas Edition, April 15, 1989, p. 10. 
V 
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aid philosophy and will raise serious concerns among American officials as 
furthering a mercantilist Japanese policy stance. 
Over the next several years, the United States could easily follow the 
opposite trend. Recognition that the federal budget deficit is a major 
economic problem for the United States is now quite widespread, although 
progress in reducing the deficit remains limited. The progress in achieving 
this goal could be somewhat limited over the next several years, but the 
direction of change will be downward and not upward. By taking some of the 
pressure off capital markets, and thereby reducing the net inflow of capital 
from the rest of the world, this scenario leads to a smaller U.S. 
merchandise trade and current-account deficit (brought about by a continued 
weak dollar and by slower growth of consumer demand). 
A reduction of the U.S. global deficit must affect trade with Asia. 
These countries will find the United States a less vibrant market for their 
exports, and will find themselves under more pressure from the United States 
to dismantle their own import barriers in order to facilitate absorption of 
swelling exports from the United States. These developments could also 
affect American direct investment in Asia. To date, however, there is 
little evidence of a slowdown in the pace of American direct investment in 
manufacturing in Asia. From 1985 to 1987, American cumulative FDI in 
manufacturing in Asia and the Pacific other than Japan grew at a 20 percent 
annual rate.11 Nevertheless, the depreciation of the dollar ought to bring 
11. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of 
Current Business, August 1988, pp. 47-52. U.S. data are not compatible 
with Japanese data cited earlier because the United States measures the 
current value of local investments (including reinvested earnings and 
local capital sources), whereas Japan measures only the cumulative flow 
of investment funds from Japan. 
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some reconsideration of new overseas investment when those investments are 
motivated by cost savings. ^  
With these economic developments in Japan and the United States comes a 
substantial role reversal in the region: Japan's image will improve while 
that of the United States will worsen. Japan will be the growing market for 
Asian manufactured exports while the United States is not; Japan will become 
a source of a rising amount of direct investment (which may be quite 
welcome if it generates exports back to Japan) while American firms may slow 
their investment; budget cutting in Washington may bring further reductions 
in the already small U.S. foreign aid budget, while Japan's continues to 
grow. Meanwhile, the antagonism that remains as a legacy of the Second 
World War will further diminish as generational transition continues 
(including the death of the Showa emperor, eliminating a symbol of Asian 
distrust of Japan). The Japanese are, for example, touting the idea that 
the United States has eliminated GSP treatment for the Asian NICs while 
Japan has not. Prime Minister Takeshita also made a point of presenting 
issues of concern to Asian countries at the 1989 industrial-nation summit 
meeting, another symbolic gesture representing a unilateral assumption of a 
role as Asian spokesman. The intent appears to have been to impress Asian 
countries that Japan is different from other industrial nations 
demonstrating its interest and concern for the interests of regional nations 
at this meeting. 
Implications for Japan's Role in Regional Cooperation  
12. Some caution is in order here, since dollar appreciation in the first 
half of the 1980s did not bring any acceleration of outward foreign 
direct investment by U.S. firms. U.S. Department of Commerce, 
International Trade Administration, International Direct Investment; 
Global Trends and the U.S. Role, 1988 Edition (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 20. 
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Japan has been a rather insular nation over the postwar period, willing 
to export to the world but unwilling to play much of an active role in any 
other way. Now Japan is inevitably drawn into a more active role by its 
ownership of overseas assets and provision of ODA. Furthermore, Japan 
exhibits much greater interest in the Asia-Pacific region after years of 
largely ignoring its Asian neighbors. Given the general rise of economic 
ties within the region over time, some form of closer cooperative 
arrangements makes sense. 
To the extent that Japan's outreach to the region promotes economic 
development, the recent changes are entirely to be welcomed. However, there 
is room for concern about the nature of Japan's interaction with the region 
because the newfound interest may drift toward a regionalism that seeks to 
exclude the United States and other industrial countries. Despite the fact 
that little of the official rhetoric makes specific statements to this 
effect, the possibility of such a development must be recognized. What the 
Japanese see as so encouraging about the rest of Asia (and especially the 
four NICs plus Thailand) are similarities to Japan's own economic 
development in the past. That is, the focus is on aspects of these 
economies and cultures which provide a link to Japan, and not to the West or 
the United States. Even the spread of offices of Japanese department and 
super stores through Asia has been described as part of this process (in an 
article envisioning a large Japanese-run regional distribution network 
throughout Asia in the not-too-distant future. Because they maintain both 
buying operations and sales outlets, Japanese firms are described as having 
superior information-gathering ability and "greater trustworthiness" 
compared to American or European distributors, who have operated purchasing 
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offices in these countries for years. 3 Others have referred to Asia as a 
large high-quality market in which Japanese firms will plan their 
procurement from the "most appropriate" production base."1^ 
The key element in these and other commentaries on Asia is the sense of 
exclusivity. The United States or other industrial nations are rarely 
mentioned, or if they are, it is in a negative context. An aggressive tone 
has emerged in some articles, in which the Japanese portray the United 
States as being unfair to the rest of Asia, in explicit or implicit 
comparison to a more benevolent Japan. Consider, for example the title of a 
recent cover story in a major Japanese business publication: "No More 
Japans! Japan and the U.S. Policy of Beating Up South Korea and Taiwan."15 
Some Japanese have gone so far as to see evolving regionalism in the 
Western Pacific proceeding as far as it has in Europe, driven by both the 
high yen and the continuing economic development of other countries in Asia. 
In a recent roundtable discussion, one participant surmised that "Japan and 
other Asian countries will increasingly draw away from the United States," a 
trend viewed with favor because Asia has been "overly dependent" on the 
13. "Yu'nyu Daikyosui II: Kaihatsu Yu'nyu ga Kasoku Suru Hyakkaten-Supa no 
Ajia Ryutsuken" [The Big Flood of Imports II: The Asian Sphere of the 
Department Stores and Super Stores' Accelerating Development Imports], 
Toyo Keizai, July 4, 1987, p. 14. 
14. Yukiko Fukugawa, "Ajia no Dainamizumu o Torikomu Nihon," pp. 86-89. 
15. "No Moa Japanl Beikoku no Kankoku-Taiwan Tataki to Nihon", Toyo Keizai, 
July 18, 1987, pp. 4-17. The article is actually somewhat more 
innocuous than the sensational title, dealing with the decision of USTR 
to keep South Korea and Taiwan from becoming trade problems on the order 
of Japan by making them open up their markets earlier. But the tone of 
the title and much of the writing is one of American fear of having more 
successful industrialized countries across the Pacific. 
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United States."16 A long-term economic forecast to the year 2000 issued by 
the Research Institute on the National Economy (a respected private group) 
adopts a similar position, predicting that the continued rapid growth and 
development of the Asian NICs will make closer ties between them and Japan 
more likely. This report anticipates a greater horizontal division of 
industry and a rise of intra-industry trade, bringing about a de facto yen 
bloc as the portion of regional trade denominated in yen rises naturally.17 
More conservative organizations avoid endorsing any exclusive regional 
grouping, but point out the same trends in trade and investment that imply 
much closer ties between Japan and the rest of Asia. For example, a recent 
report from an advisory committee to MITT with a heavy representation of 
"internationalists" foresees a new posture for Japan toward Asia, and makes 
a major point of Japan's continued GSP treatment for the Asian NICs. This 
same report speaks of Japan becoming a major market for the exports of these 
countries, although it generally casts its discussion in a multilateral 
framework that explicitly includes the United States. The report endorses 
initiatives such as JAIDO by stressing that Japan's Asia policy should be a 
coherent package which will draw Japan and Asian economies closer together. 
The elements of this coordinated package are to include importing more from 
16. Roundtable discussion with Toshio Watanabe, Naoki Tanaka, and Masao 
Okonogi, "Kankoku ga Senshin Koku ni Naru Hi" [The Day South Korea 
Becomes an Advanced Country], Ekonomisuto Rinji Zokan, November 2, 1988. 
The remarks are from Professor Watanabe, a specialist on Asian economic 
development. 
17. Kokumin Keizai Kenkyukai [Research Institute on the National Economy is 
the official English rendition of the Institute's name], Choki Keizai 
Yosoku; 2000-Nen no Nihon Keizai, Higashi Ajia Koiki Keizaiken no 
Kannosei [Long-Term Economic Forecast: The Japanese Economy in the Year 
2000--The Possibility of a Broad Economic Area in East Asia] (Tokyo: 
Kokumin Keizai Kenkyukai, August 1988), especially pp. 9-15. 
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Asia, using foreign direct investment to bring about industrial 
specialization, implementation of an expanded medium-term foreign aid 
program, cooperation on energy policy, and increased regional dialogue. The 
report stresses strongly the granting of foreign aid to specifically service 
Japan's private-sector investment activities in developing countries. ° 
As might be expected from such discussion in Japan, some debate has been 
occurring in Japan over new institutional arrangements for the Asia Pacific 
region. Officially the Japanese government stands in favor of integrating 
the Asian NICs into the OECD, a position that should be applauded. At the 
same time, however, the Japanese government is pursuing creation of a new 
regional organization. A report on this topic by an advisory commission to 
MITI released in June 1989 supported the Australian call for ministerial-
level meetings of Asia-Pacific nations to discuss economic development and 
cooperation issues. This report also specifically speaks of 
"outward'looking" regional cooperation, and specifically includes the United 
States, Australia, and New Zealand. But it also indirectly promotes several 
MITI initiatives (such as JAIDO and a coordinated regional energy policy 
which would be dominated by Japanese firms). Other suggestions, including 
environmental protection belong in a global framework (or at least one which 
transcends the boundaries of the Asia-Pacific region) rather than a regional 
19 one. 
18. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Nihon no Sentaku: Nyu 
Gurobarizumu e no Kokan to 'Shin Sangyo Bunka Kokka' no Sentaku [Japan's 
Choices: Choices Concerning Contribution to the New Globalism and the 
New National Industrial Culture] (Tokyo: Tsusho Chosakai, 1988), pp. 
46-47, 50-53. 
19. Report of the Council for the Promotion of Asian-Pacific Cooperation: 
Toward an Era of Development Through Outward-Looking Cooperation 
(Summary), June 1989. See also Japan Times weekly Overseas Edition, 
Continued on next page ^ 
-21-
A number of academics and government officials are also very interested 
in the concept of a free trade zone, either bilaterally with the United 
States or regionally. In some sense this concept goes back as far as the 
late 1960s when the Japanese proposed a Pacific Free Trade Area. u At the 
present time, the Japanese claim their motivation is due to a perception 
that the United States is moving away from a multilateral approach to trade, 
as evidenced by the U.S.-Canada agreement. They also note the statements by 
former Ambassador Mike Mansfield and various members of Congress in favor of 
a bilateral free trade arrangement with Japan. However, their interest 
appears to go beyond a simple reaction to an American position. 
The concept of a bilateral free trade zone with Japan or other Asian 
countries has very little support in Washington. Virtually no U.S. 
government officials at all familiar with Japan are in favor of such an 
arrangement, for a variety of reasons. Discussion of a regional arrangement 
is not likely to proceed very far either. The basic problem lies in the 
perception that trade barriers in Japan are not easily addressed in a free 
trade agreement, so that such a move would not provide much increased access 
to Japanese markets. Furthermore, a bilateral deal with any single country 
Continued from previous page 
April 8, 1989. The genesis of the proposal was to provide Prime 
Minister Takeshita a /present" to take to ASEAN on a state visit in late 
April, but the report was not issued until after his demise as prime 
minister. 
20. Harry Harding and Edward Lincoln, "The East Asian Laboratory," in John 
D. Steinbruner, ed., Restructuring American Foreign Policy (Washington: 
The Brookings Institution, 1989)j, p. 193. 
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or a limited group of Asian nations would be extremely poor diplomacy, 
raising immediate protests or demands for similar treatment from the rest. 1 
There is a scenario, however, in which a regional trade arrangement 
could emerge regardless of American government opinion. If the European 
nations were to become somewhat more protectionist toward the rest of the 
world after 1992, and if the United States spurns the idea of a bilateral or 
regional trade arrangement with Japan or Asia, the rising trade and 
investment ties between Japan and Asia, as well as the increased interest of 
the Japanese in their Asian connection could well lead to consideration of 
an Asian preferential trade zone exclusive of the United States. Other 
Asian nations would likely oppose such a move, but given rising exports to 
Japan (compared to stagnant sales to the United States), pressure from the 
United States to open their markets, rising FDI from Japan, rising ODA from 
Japan, and other inducements, their acquiescence is possible in the 1990s. 
Policy Implications 
The scenario just sketched is a troubling one. An Asian economic zone 
centered on Japan would not be to the long-term interest of the United 
States and it might be destabilizing to the region as well. Asian countries 
might go along with initiatives from Japan, but the exclusivity that would 
accompany such an arrangement would bring considerable tensions. In 
addition, American commitment to a substantial military presence in the 
region would be severely damaged by any economic development which seeks to 
exclude the United States. A diminished American military presence would be 
21. For a review of these and other arguments both for and against a free 
trade area with Japan or other Asian countries, see the International 
Trade Commissions recent survey of pros and cons on a free trade area 
with Japan and with other Asian nations. 
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a further destabilizing development especially in the presence of an 
increasingly dominant economic Japan. 
This scenario remains relatively unlikely. However, the following 
proposals would make it less likely and would help to move the region in the 
direction of a more productive cooperation: 
1. Japan should dramatically increase its training of specialists on 
the region. A stronger core of people in Japan who can speak to the needs 
and problems of Asian developing countries would improve the quality of 
Japanese foreign aid, act to counter the heavily commercial orientation of 
aid and other aspects of Japanese foreign policy toward the region, and 
would provide a more human dimension to Japan's interaction with Asian 
countries. A major expansion of university area studies programs, including 
greater opportunities to study or travel abroad, should be the key element 
in this development. In addition, however, Japan could use a strong effort 
by the government to create something akin to the American Peace Corps of 
the 1960s. Japan has an equivalent to the Peace Corps, but the missing 
element is any visibility or any evidence of substantial interest among the 
Japanese in working for such an organization. Service abroad, and especially 
in Asia, should be elevated to a more acceptable position. The point is not 
effectiveness (as many see the U.S. Peace Corps as ineffective in the 
1960s), but to generate international experience, understanding, and 
interest among the Japanese. 
2. Japan should also continue its macroeconomic adjustment, expanding 
domestic demand as part of a program to both benefit the Japanese public and 
to reduce the trade surplus by absorbing more imports. This process must 
enable foreign firms to get a real chance to sell more to Japan; if 
increased imports come primarily from the overseas subsidiaries of Japanese 
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firms, domestic demand expansion will have failed to bring about real change 
in Japan's position in the world. Conversely, the United States must also 
continue its macroeconomic adjustment. Admitting the dilemmas this poses 
for the American image in Asia, the need for reduction or elimination of the 
trade and current-account deficit is overwhelming. 
3. Japan should stick to a multilateral framework in dealing with the 
rest of the Asia-Pacific region. Moves such as promoting the NICs seminar 
in the OECD in the spring of 1988 should be continued; discussion of 
bilateral or regional trade blocs should be discouraged. This is an area 
where the Japanese government could easily take a strong initiative, 
clarifying its commitment to the GATT and the Uruguay round, disassociating 
itself from notions of bilateral or regional preferential trade schemes, and 
ending government-sponsored research on these ideas. There is no harm in 
the periodic ministerial conference proposed by Australia's Prime Minister 
Hawke (and strongly supported by the Japanese), but many issues which the 
Japanese envision discussing--trade, environment, promotion of foreign 
direct investment--are more appropriate in non-regional settings. 
4. The United States should also do all it can to encourage Japan to 
move in a more liberal, less mercantilist direction toward the rest of the 
Asia-Pacific region. Greater communication on issues of mutual interest 
where Japan can play a beneficial and useful role are important in order to 
ensure that Japanese policy toward the region evolves in a manner that is 
advantageous to all and not just for Japanese corporations. The United  
States must also maintain a presence in Asian matters. Foreign aid should 
be increased and Japanese efforts to gain greater control over the Asian 
Development Bank should be resisted. If the United States plays a more 
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limited role in Asia in the future, Asian countries would have little choice 
but to accept Japanese policy initiatives. 
These four points do not represent any innovation or major change in 
policy. The GATT, United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions 
were created in the early postwar era out of a belief that regionalism was 
not desirable as a general principle. The reasons for opposing preferential 
regional arrangements are as strong today as 40 years ago. The informal 
organizations that now provide an overlapping set of fora in which 
businessmen, academics, and government officials of Asian-Pacific countries 
can interact are all positive steps; as we have moved toward greater 
economic integration, the need for enhanced communications and information 
exchange has become stronger. However, any stronger formal institutional 
framework is not advisable, especially if it includes any form of 
preferential trade. This would be true even if the United States were a 
participant in a regional scheme, and is even more true if such an 
arrangement were centered on Japan without the United States. 
Table 6 
Recent Trends in Foreign Direct Investment 
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